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International trade in education is a large and growing phenomenon. We investi-
gate the consequences of such trade for economic growth in developing countries using
a model with a role for trade costs and endogenous emigration of students educated
abroad. The developing country’s comparative disadvantage in education means that
trade allows it to acquire human capital at a lower opportunity cost, and raise its steady-
state growth rate. If a sufﬁciently large share of students remain abroad, however, the
net effect of international trade and skilled migration reduces steady-state growth rates
below their autarky levels.
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Recent years have seen a rapid expansion of international trade in educational services. By
1998, the value of such trade had reached US$30 billion – 3 per cent of global trade in ser-
vices.1 In 2005 there were over 2 million students undertaking higher education in foreign
countries.2 This number is projected to rise to 8 million by 2025.3 The Doha Round of multi-
lateral trade negotiations has seen several proposals to further liberalize trade in education
services.
Educationalservicestradeusuallyinvolvesdevelopingcountrystudentstravelingabroad
to study in developed countries. Foreign students’ experience in these countries can leave
them favorably disposed toward permanent migration to their host countries. Education
abroad may also improve students’ chances of successful migration.4 The emigration of stu-
dents who have studied abroad is an inescapable feature of trade in educational services.
Zhang and Li (2002) calculate that roughly 75 percent of Chinese students studying abroad
between 1978 and 1999 had not returned to live in China.5 Rosenzweig (2008) ﬁnds that the
staying rate of students educated in the United States is approximately 20 percent.
We build an analytical model that captures key features of trade in educational services,
focusingontheimplicationsofsuchtradeforeconomicgrowthinadevelopingcountry. Our
work is conceptually similar to Lee (1995), who builds trade in capital goods into an endoge-
nous growth model.6 Like Rosenzweig (2008), we investigate the decision to purchase edu-
1See Larsen et al. (2002). In selected countries, trade in education is even more signiﬁcant. According to
Reserve Bank of Australia (2008), education accounts for fully one quarter of Australia’s services exports.
2UNESCO estimate cited in Rosenzweig (2008).
3Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (2005).
4Some host countries (e.g. Australia) have immigration policies that favor skilled migrants, and degrees
earned at host country institutions can help students qualify for host country citizenship.
5Thedenominatorinthisratioincludessomestudentswhowerecurrentlystudying, sothereturnrateupon
graduation in this case was likely somewhat higher than one in four.
6We differ from Lee in that we explain an absence of complete specialization in the developing country
via an assumption about the form of trade costs. Lee assumes that domestic- and foreign-made capital are
imperfect substitutes in production, so the existence of a developing-country capital-producing sector results
from the assumed form of the production technology. Our model also differs from Lee’s in that the human
1cationabroad,andtreatthemigrationdecisionasdependentonthatpossibility.7 Ourmodel
isalsorelatedtothe’braindrain’literature.8 Ourfocusisnotonthemigrationdecisionitself,
but we do consider the effect of such migration on the decision to import international edu-
cation. Our contribution is to formalize trade in education in an endogenous growth model
that contains a role for endogenous migration. We take economic growth and endogenous
migration to be the most salient issues for developing countries that import education ser-
vices.
In section 2 of the paper we describe a closed economy, two-sector endogenous growth
model similar to that of Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1988). An education sector uses human
capital to produce human capital. In the goods sector, ﬁrms combine human capital with
physicalcapitaltoproduceagoodthatcanbeconsumed,exported,orinstalledasnewphys-
ical capital. We solve for the model’s steady state under autarky.
We assume that the developing country’s education sector has a permanent technolog-
ical disadvantage, relative to the rest-of-world education sector. We derive the implications
for the trade pattern and for developing country growth in section 3. Trade in education al-
lows human capital to be acquired at lower opportunity cost than in autarky. This remains
true when we incorporate trade costs, which are quite plausibly large for trade of this sort.
The developing country imports education and exports the physical capital/consumption
good.
In section 4 we consider the possibility that students educated abroad may choose per-
manent emigration. Emigration represents a reduction in the education importer’s terms
of trade in our framework, and it may lead to lower-than-autarky growth rates. We model
emigration as an endogenous outcome that depends upon returns to human capital in the
capital in our model is free to choose migration, whereas the physical capital in his model is fully installed
upon purchase.
7Our primary difference with Rosenzweig (2008) is that we model these movements in the context of a gen-
eral equilibrium model of trade and growth.
8Miyagiwa (1991) provides an early example of an endogenous growth model with brain drain. Bhagwati
and Hamada (1974) build an early trade model with brain drain and investigate the effect on unemployment.
2developing country and in the rest of the world. Low returns to education in the developing
country lead to greater emigration, ceteris paribus. Because the education sector employs
human capital exclusively, countries with highly inefﬁcient education technologies will tend
to have low skilled wages, fostering greater emigration. This suggests a paradox: while the
valueofimportededucationislargestinthosecountrieswiththeleast-productiveeducation
technologies, countries with such technologies will tend to suffer more from endogenous
emigration. Countries with education technologies that are reasonably close to the fron-
tier have less outward migration, so access to better technology via trade in education raises
economic growth rates.
2 Autarky model
Our closed economy growth model follows Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1988).9 We consider a
simple economy with two production sectors: a commodity production sector and an ed-
ucation (human capital production) sector. There are two factors of production, physical
capital (K) and human capital (H). Human capital is spread evenly among the population,
L, so H can be characterized as product of L and h, the human capital of the typical person
(H = Lh). New human capital is produced with existing human capital as the only factor of
production.
A representative household undertakes a range of activities. It provides labor services
(with human capital incorporated) in exchange for wages; it earns interest income on assets
(i.e. physical capital); it purchases consumable goods and education services; and it saves
by accumulating physical capital. We model these phenomenon in a continuous-time set-
ting. Arepresentativeworkerchoosesthelevelofphysicalcapitalinvestment,humancapital
investment (including the education-importing decision) and consumption at time t.10
9We follow the notation and discussion in chapter 5 of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).







where xt is the fraction of total human capital employed in sector Y at time t, A is a shift
parameter deﬁning the total factor productivity (TFP), A >0, and α∈(0,1). The closed econ-
omy’s resource constraint is
Ct + ˙ Kt +δKt =AK
α(xtHt)
(1−α), (2)
where C is total consumption and δ is the depreciation rate for physical capital.
The education sector employs H to produce H using the technology:
˙ Ht +δHt = B(1−xt)Ht, (3)
where B > 0 denotes the productivity parameter in the education sector. For notational
simplicity, we assume that the depreciation rate for human capital is equivalent to that of
physical capital, δ.
We normalize the size of the work force at time 0 to unity, and assume a constant popu-
lation growth rate of n. The population’s size at time t is given by Lt = e nt. We work largely




, the per capita stock of physical capital kt ≡
Kt
Lt










, and the ratio of con-






. We derive growth rates for the per capita stocks
the terms of trade and the human capital formation function of education. Were we to focus on the time-
based opportunity costs of education we might have usefully employed an overlapping generations model. We
abstract from such issues here.










γht = B(1−xt)−(δ+n), (5)
and




t −ckt − B(1−xt). (6)
The representative household’s utility function takes the form of a constant intertempo-







where θ > 0 represents the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. The agent maximizes
lifetime discounted utility, subject to the motion equations for human and physical capital,
non-negativity constraints on consumption, human and physical capital, and transversality
conditionsimposedonphysicalandhumancapital. FollowingOrtigueiraandSantos(1997),
we impose the condition ρ−n >(B −δ)(1−θ) (where ρ is the discount rate), which guaran-
tees that the optimization problem yields a unique solution of {ct,ht,kt,xt}. If investment
in K and H is strictly positive in each period, then the problem can be characterized by the
Hamiltonian:
H =u(ct)e
−(ρ−n)t +νt[yt −ct −(δ+n)kt]+µt[B(1−xt)ht −(δ+n)ht], (8)
5where νt and µt are the shadow prices at time t of physical capital and human capital, re-
spectively. The representative household makes an optimal decision in period t regarding
its asset stream (in terms of physical capital), as well as its stock of human capital (which it
accumulates by purchasing the output of the education sector).
We choose a consumption stream to optimize (8), and solve for a number of variables in






























represents the relative price of installed human capital in units of contemporane-
ous output. Equation (10) indicates that the relative price of human capital is increasing in
ˆ kt (the ratio of physical capital to human capital employed in sector Y) and decreasing in xt
(the share of human capital employed in the commodity sector). Both these relationships
link human capital scarcity to a high relative price of human capital.
The steady state of the system can be deﬁned when x is constant and c,k,h grow at
constant and equal rates γk = γh = γc. ˙ γˆ k, ˙ γck, and ˙ γx will equal zero in the steady state,






































The corresponding steady state growth rate of yt, ct,kt and ht is:












, will stay ﬁxed (it is evaluated at ﬁxed ˆ k
and x), while k,h,c grow at a constant rate, ¯ γ. Note that these latter rates are increasing in
B, the technology parameter in the education sector. This is relevant because trade in edu-
cation will allow this economy to access the output of a more productive foreign education
sector.
As is common in the trade literature, we are interested in the relationship between out-
put prices and factor prices. We derive the relationships among goods and factor prices in
autarky using the value marginal products of capital and human capital in the goods sector
along with equation (10). These expressions contain variables xt and ˆ kt, which can be elim-
inated via substitution of (11) and (13). Doing so allows us to solve for factor prices in terms


































7Both factor prices are increasing in the output price of the sector that employs it most inten-
sively, and increasing in the TFP parameter that applies to that industry.
3 Trade in educational services
We now consider the opening up of the economy to trade in educational services. We as-
sume the country in question is small in comparison to the rest of the world, so its accu-
mulation of physical and human capital has a negligible impact on the world interest rate
and return to education. Neither do its trade policies affect output prices in the rest of the
world. Tohighlighttheimpactofthetransferofhumancapitalacrosscountriesoneconomic
growth, we also assume that the developing country cannot borrow internationally, so that
the value of imports must be covered by exports in each period of the model. Furthermore,
we assume costless trade in the capital-intensive good, and normalize both the world and
domestic prices of the capital-intensive good to 1.
Assume that the rest of the world (hereafter ROW) is more efﬁcient than the home coun-
try (hereafter HOME) in producing education such that B∗ > B.11 Under this assumption,
ROW retains an absolute advantage in producing education. Both HOME’s technological
disadvantage and its (endogenous) relative scarcity in human capital give it a comparative
disadvantage in education. HOME will import human capital and export Y when it opens
up to trade with the developed ROW. Equations (10), (11) and (13) can be combined to show



















This is a formal statement of HOME’s comparative disadvantage in the education sector.
11We use ∗ to denote ROW variables. We remove t subscripts from ROW variables because our small country
assumption leaves these variables ﬁxed in the steady state.
8The most common form of trade in education involves the temporary migration of stu-
dents from a source country to a host country to obtain education services. This temporary
migrationcaninvolvehighrelocationcosts, aswellascostsassociatedwithlearningthehost
country’s language, identifying quality educational institutions, and more. We characterize
these frictions as adjustment costs that occur as the human capital is ’installed.’ The adjust-
ment cost also helps us justify the developing country’s retention of a domestic education
sector. Absent trade costs, constant returns to scale in the education sector would ensure
that costless trade would lead HOME to specialize completely in the consumable good, and
to import all its human capital.
Our adjustment cost is an increasing function of the share of imported education ser-
vices, I ∗

















>0, which implies that the adjustment cost is increas-
ing in the volume of educational services imports. To facilitate the analysis further, we adopt
a particular functional form for trade costs:
Φ(χt)=ηχt, (19)
where η>0 is the proportional increase in trade costs associated with an increase in χ. The
developing country’s average terms of trade are such that it must give up pE∗ +ηχt units of
the exportable for each unit of imported education.12
The assumption of convex adjustment costs is common in the growth literature. In this
12Because of convex adjustment/trade costs, we will need to distinguish between the price of imported edu-
cation (a marginal condition) and the average terms of trade.
9context, the form also implies trade costs that are increasing in the volume of trade. Dear-
dorff (2006) argues that increasing marginal trade costs offer useful advantages in simple
trade models: they lead to incomplete specialization, and they can help explain the ’miss-
ing trade’ that constant returns to scale models typically imply. We view increasing marginal
trade costs in education as highly plausible.13 What is more, they facilitate the incomplete
specialization that we observe in practice.14
Trade in our model involves an exchange of the consumable good for imported human
capital. Under balanced (and costly) trade, the developing country must give up pE∗
t +ηχt
units of the consumable in exchange for one unit of imported human capital investment I ∗.
Our new Hamiltonian appears as
H = u(ct)e







Relative to (8), the terms (pE∗+ηχt)I ∗
ht and I ∗
ht have been added to the motion equations for
physical and human capital, respectively.














13Developing countries may, for example, have limited capacity to prepare students for study abroad. Lan-
guage training would seem to be a particular hurdle. Furthermore, if students vary in their abilities, and better
studentsaretheﬁrsttobeginstudyabroad,thenmarginaltradecostswillincreasewiththetradevolume. Small
groups of foreign students may be able to attend the ’best’ foreign institutions, while larger volumes might re-
quire the use of foreign institutions that are less suited to the education of foreign students. Larger volumes of
imported education may also require the developing country to purchase education from more host countries
(and possibly train students in more host country languages) and that may further raise costs of trade.
14Few developing countries appear to have outsourced their entire tertiary education program. While this
may primarily be attributed to developing countries’ government policies (which aim at retaining a tertiary
education sector for cultural and political reasons), it may also be partially attributed to trade costs.


























We can use (21) to simplify (22), and link the relative shadow price of human and physical






Note that the appearance of χt in (23) means that the relative price that governs the repre-
sentative household’s investment decision is increasing in the trade volume. Note also that
the wedge between the domestic relative shadow price and the ROW relative price is double
that observed in (19). The optimizing condition relies on the marginal trade cost, 2ηχt, even
as the average trade cost, ηχt, applies in the balance-of-trade condition.
In order to build intuition we illustrate the trade equilibrium in Figure 1. We employ an
offer curve diagram familiar from trade theory. Because the developing country is small, the
ROW offer curve is diagonal. However, increasing marginal trade costs mean that the de-
veloping country faces, in effect, an offer curve that is bowed inward. Under costly trade,
the intersection of this curve with the Home country offer curve deﬁnes the trade equilib-
rium (in the steady state), with the traded quantity equalling χTC.15 The line from the origin
through the equilibrium point has slope pE∗+ηχt, reﬂecting the average terms of trade. The
ROW offer curve, net of trade costs, has slope pE∗+2ηχt at the equilibrium point.
Turning back to the mathematics, we solve for the new steady state with trade in educa-
15In the case where there are no trade costs, the equilibrium trade volume is larger, at χF.






























































Let cT,xT, ˆ k T and χ be the solutions of the system of non-linear equations given in (24) -



















Comparing (29) with (14) shows that the difference between the trade and autarky steady
16We use superscript T to denote variables in the trade equilibrium.
12state growth rates is given by:
¯ γ





which is positive for positive trade ﬂows (χ > 0). Because education trade allows HOME ac-
cess to human capital at a lower opportunity cost, HOME’s growth rate increases with trade.
4 Skilled migration
One of the issues a developing country encounters when importing education services is
that students educated abroad often choose to stay abroad. We will call this loss of foreign-
educated students "skilled migration."17 It seems likely that trade in education services via
study abroad facilitates migration, as it allows students to develop familiarity with the host
country’s language and institutions, to establish connections with potential employers, and
to better exploit host country immigrant networks that often facilitate permanent migra-
tion.18 In the context of our model, migration of this sort can be interpreted as a deterio-
ration in the developing country’s terms of trade. Our formalization of this effect within a
dynamic model allows an evaluation of the effects of skilled migration on the accumulation
of both human and physical capital, and on economic growth.
To isolate the role that trade in education plays in migration, we will assume that direct
migrationislimited,andthatonlyforeign-educatedstudentsmigrate. We"semi-endogenize"
the rate of students’ returning home upon graduation, linking it to the wage gap between
HOME and ROW, and to an additional cost of settling in ROW. The return rate is semi-
endogenous in the sense that the representative agent in HOME (who makes the consump-
tion, saving and human capital investment decisions) is not choosing the level of migration;
17One might also call it "brain drain."
18Rosenzweig (2008) notes that a large number of U.S. permanent residents who later obtain immigration
visas do so through marriage to US citizens.
13she treats this rate as a given. The migration rate is, however, endogenous to the wage gap;
this is a reduced form ’decision’ by students educated abroad. For simplicity, we assume that
the developing country decisionmaker gets no utility from the emigrant’s higher wages.19





where M(t) represents the migration ﬂow or population change in the source country in
every period t (following Braun (1993), cited in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)) and ξLt ∈
[0,1]. The net growth rate of L over time is adjusted by the migration of graduated students,
and is now speciﬁed as:
γLt =n −ξLt (32)
We also ﬁnd it useful to relate the number of migrants to the subset of the population
that is acquiring foreign education. Let us denote the share of foreign educated students
returning home as λt ∈ [0,1]. We will refer to λ as the returning rate. If λ < 1, the source
country will suffer a terms of trade loss associated with migration. The country will pay a
gross amount of (pE∗ + ηχt)I ∗
H,t for I ∗
H,t units of imported education but will only receive
λtI ∗




=n −ξL,t =n −(1−λt)χt. (33)
One of the main reasons students stay in the host country upon graduation is that they
can receive a higher wage rate when entering the work force in the host country than in
19One might expect that parents get utility from their children’s revealed preference for life in ROW, or that
they might receive remittances from descendants. Since these effects are unlikely to persist into the inﬁnite fu-
ture, we abstract away from them, assuming that the agent only cares to maximize utility of those descendants
who return to the developing country.
14the source country. We consider the case in which the skilled migration of graduates is of a
permanent nature, as we want to see how this consequence of trade in education will affect
the source country’s long-run growth rate. A student might consider a permanent residence
in the host country if w ∗ >wt with ∀t, t ∈[τ,...∞).20 Assume that the above wage condition
holds, then we can deﬁne the beneﬁt from permanent migration as:
βt =w
∗−wt >0 (34)
We follow the discussion in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) (attributed to Braun (1993))
by specifying the migration cost with the form:
C(ξLt) = ςξLtwt ς>0 (35)
This speciﬁcation is chosen largely for convenience, it implies that the cost incurred by
each staying graduate is assumed to be an increasing function of the student migration rate
ξL,t. The key property here is that the cost of moving for the marginal emigrant is rising with
the number of emigrants. This might reﬂect increasing resistance to migration in ROW.21 It
may also reﬂect that selection effects lead those who can migrate at lowest cost to remain
while others return home.22 The migration cost is assumed to show up as a quantity of work
time foregone, so that, for a given rate of student migration, ξL,t, the cost measured in units
of output is proportional to the source country’s human capital wage rate, wt, which the
graduates would have earned in their original locations in the period of migration.
20Ideally we would allow the potential migrant to consider the present value of the future wage streams over
theperiod[τ,∞).This would notgiveus aclosedformsolution in thesteadystate. Our installation costinsures
that a recent graduate would be more likely to return home than to pay the cost so that a past graduate can
return home. In that sense, we might view the current period decision as permanent in the steady state.
21Notice, however, that our small-country assumption means that the migration of HOME’s students should
not affect the welfare of the workers in ROW.
22On the other hand, there might also be returns to scale in migration, because critical mass in a single
immigrant community can lower the costs to each member. We wish to be clear that convex migration costs
are a choice of convenience in this setting.






The equilibrium returning rate is decreasing in the wage gap at time t, and increasing in the
migration cost, the trade volume, and in the home country wage rate.
Equation (36) highlights a problem for the developing country. Low wages (w), migra-
tion costs (ς), or trade volumes (χ) imply low values of λ. λ = 0 implies that all HOME’s for-
eign educated students choose to stay abroad. Opening to trade in education leads HOME
to increase its exports of the consumption good, but it receives no installed human capi-
tal through imports in return. With human and physical capital stocks growing more slowly
thaninautarky,growthratesintheeconomyarelowerthantheywouldhavebeeninautarky.
This occurs if the domestic return to human capital is too low, relative to the migration-cost-




The returning rate of foreign students need not be zero for trade to reduce HOME’s rate
of growth below its autarky level. In order to generalize this condition we return to the rep-


































The new terms (relative to 20) are
t R
0
ξL(j)d j in the objective function, and ξLt and λ in the
motion equations for capital and human capital, respectively. The ﬁrst derivative of H with
23The superscript M indicates the trade and migration setting.

































Employing the remaining ﬁrst order conditions associated with differentiating (37), we solve
for the growth rates of selected variables in the model. The growth rate of optimal consump-













The growth rate of ˆ kt is:
γ
M







−ckt − B(1−xt)−λtχt +ξLt
























, andthemigrationrate, ξL,t, asgiven
at the time when the optimizing decision is made.
17differential, the human capital allocation ratio (xt), the trade volume (χt), the physical-
human capital ratio (kt), the physical capital-consumption ratio (ck,t) and the student re-







































Recall from above that the student returning rate, λ, is regarded as a "semi-endogenous"
variable in our model. It is endogenous to the wage gap, but the household has no direct
control over it.25 From the relationship speciﬁed in (45) we observe that skilled migration
(λ < 1) implies a greater domestic price of education in HOME. A related implication is that
the marginal product of human capital in the goods sector must rise. This is accomplished
via the movement of human capital from the goods sector to the education sector. Emigra-
tion of foreign-educated students represents a deterioration in the terms of trade, and leads
to the reallocation of HOME’s resources towards the sector in which it has a comparative
disadvantage, the education sector.
Figure2illustratestheeffectofendogenousmigrationonthetradeequilibrium. Endoge-
nous migration shifts leftward the effective ROW offer curve facing HOME. Migration also
25The household can forecast it perfectly, but must treat its response to conditions as exogenous in the opti-
mizing decision.
18shifts HOME’s offer curve rightward, as the developing country agent realizes that a fraction
of imported education will be lost to migration. If the shift in the effective ROW curve is suf-
ﬁciently large (so that the curve lies to the left of the HOME country’s autarky reference line),
HOME cannot beneﬁt from trade. We draw the ﬁgure in a manner that suggests trade is still
beneﬁcial, and the steady state level of imports is χM.
The wage gap between the two countries can be so large that λ = 0 and the price of
imported education (net of trade costs and migration) becomes inﬁnite. We focus on the


























Substituting (47) into (40) returns the steady state growth rate in the presence of trade in










rate of the source country is clearly smaller than the steady state growth rate without skilled
migration. In order to compare ¯ γM with the autarky growth rate, we subtract (14) from (48):
¯ γ





If (49) is negative, then the autarky growth rate is higher than the growth rate with trade
19and migration. Inspection of (49) reveals that it can become negative for sufﬁciently small
values of λ, provided χ remains positive. Rather than rely on this observation with two en-
dogenous variables, we investigate the dependence of the sign of ¯ γM − ¯ γA on the model’s
structural parameter, B.
Equation (45) links the domestic price and the international price of education via trade
costs and the return rate. Equation (46) translates these into the domestic wage. The foreign
wage can be expressed as w ∗ = B∗pE∗. Substituting for w and w ∗ in (36), and substituting
this expression for λ in (49) gives us a revised condition for slower-than-autarky growth:
χ(Bηχ(ςχ +1)− B∗pE∗+ B(pE∗+2ηχ))
B∗pE∗+ Bςχ(pE∗+2ηχ)
<0. (50)
Positive trade implies χ > 0, and therefore the denominator must be positive. Thus, the
condition in (50) holds if the parenthetical expression in the numerator is negative. We can






While the χ term is endogenous, it is bounded above by 1. All of the other values on the
right hand side are exogenous (from the point of view of the developing country) and ﬁnite.
Thus, (51) tells us that if B is sufﬁciently small, the country will experience slower growth
with trade and migration than it would in autarky. This is notable because, in the absence
of emigration, countries with low values of B would have the most to gain from trade in
education.
205 Conclusion
Trade in education represents a sizable share of world services trade. Viewed in isolation, it
seems likely that such trade facilitates human capital accumulation in education-importing
countries, and is likely to increase the growth prospects of many developing nations. Much
educational services trade is accomplished through temporary migration of students to host
countries. It also seemsquite likely that studyingabroad facilitates emigrationof developing
country students to the host nation. Our model allows us to investigate both the growth-
enhancing and migration-inducing aspects of education services trade.
Weadaptastandardtwo-sectorgrowthmodelandinvestigatethepossibleconsequences
oftradeineducationfordevelopingcountrygrowthexperiences. Ourmodelassumesatech-
nological disadvantage in the developing country’s education sector. Importing educational
services allows the country to acquire human capital more cheaply, and therefore grow at a
faster rate. We take the continuing existence of developing country educational institutions
as an important feature of the environment. In order to generate this feature in our model,
we introduce increasing marginal trade costs, which we believe are plausible in this setting.
The positive impact of trade on growth remains, even if trade costs are sizable.
We next turn our attention to the possible link between trade and the emigration of stu-
dents educated abroad. We adapt a standard treatment of emigration, and link it to the wage
gap and the volume of imported education. Emigration acts as a terms of trade loss in our
model; the developing country is unable to install all the human capital it purchases in this
setting. Countries with sufﬁciently poor education technologies have growth rates under
tradeandmigrationthatarelowerthanunderautarky. Suchcountriesmayrationallychoose
not to import education via overseas study.
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F c represent equilibrium education imports under migration, 
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